Copyright theorists often ask how incentives can be designed to create better books, movies, and art. But this is not the whole story. As the Roman satirist Martial pointed out two thousand years ago, markets routinely ignore good and even excellent works. This insight reminds us that incentives to find content are just as necessary as incentives to make it. Recent social science research explains why markets fail and how timely interventions can save deserving titles from oblivion. This Article reviews society's long struggle since the invention of literature to fix the vagaries of search. The Article builds on this history to suggest policies for the emerging world of online media.
2014]
FROM BARDS TO SEARCH ENGINES 499 This could soon be the literal truth. 11 Much of this work is valuable, and even extraordinary. As the Roman satirist Martial knew, many deserving authors go unnoticed or are initially derided. 12 For example, Percy Bysshe Shelley, 13 Henry James, 14 and Herman Melville 15 were all overlooked for decades before being discovered. 16 The same is also true for movies and music. 17 There are also contemporary examples. Many people think that J.K. Rowling is a genius; however, her book The Cuckoo's Calling, written under a pseudonym, sold just five hundred copies before she relented and allowed the publisher to use her real name. 18 II. Cf Hannah Karp, Old College Try: No-Hit Wonders Get a Fresh Shot at Fame, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB I 0001424127887323 864604579070122905147530 (arguing that college bands that were waiting to be discovered in the 1980s may yet get their chance).
12. For example, Martial ridicules a young provincial who hopes to make a living by writing verses as good "as Virgil's own": "You are mad; all that you see here shivering in threadbare cloaks are Ovids and Virgils. (You say] 'I will push my way among the great.' That trick has found support for but two or three that have attempted it, while all the rest are pale with hunger." Martial, epigrammata 3.38. See also, GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES 250 (Cooper Square Publishers, 3rd ed. rev. 1966 ) (1893 ("[M] atrial refers more than once to many amiable and deserving authors who, despite their talents, succeeded in reaching no public at all ... ").
13. SYLVIAN NORMAN, Flight of the Skylark: The Development of Shelley's Reputation (1954) .
14. Joseph Epstein, The Afterlife of the Lion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, http://online. wsj.com/news/articles/SB I 000142405297020425750457715088 I 748541906 (James' reputation was restored in 1943 after twenty years of being "out of print, out of readers and out of luck.").
15. Melville's Moby Dick (1851) sold poorly during the author's lifetime but acquired a cult following in the 1890s. This was followed by a critical revival in the 1920s. Melville's current lofty reputation only emerged in the 1940s. Chris Gaylord, Herman Melville Books: At First, 'Moby Dick' Was a Total Flop, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www .csmonitor.com/lnnovation/Tech-Culture/20 12/10 IS/Herman-Melville-books-At-first-Moby-Dick-was-a-total-flop.
16. The opposite is also true: many authors lionized in their own time eventually drop from sight. Writing in the 1930s, George Orwell expressed surprise at how many Edwardian bestsellers have been forgotten: "How many of the names in that list are known to you, I wonder? Half the books that people took seriously in those days are forgotten now." GEORGE ORWELL, COMING UP FOR AIR 125 (Peter Davison ed., Seeker & Warburg 1997) (1939) .
17. See Duncan J. Watts, A Simple Model of Global Cascadess on Random Networks, 99 PROC. NAT'L ACAD SCI. 5766, 5766 (2002) ("Why do some books; movies, and albums emerge out of obscurity, and with small marketing budgets, to become popular hits ... when many a priori indistinguishable efforts fail to rise above the noise?"); see also David Thomson, When is a Movie Great? The Perils of Medium and Magic, HARPER'S, Jul. 2011 at 35, 36 (arguing that "every year some extraordinary film is missed"); Karp, supra note ll (members of the music industry believe that '" [t] here are thousands of songs out there that could have been hits.'").
18. Paul Elie, Bound to Please, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB I 0001424127887324110404578625801325451188. Orwell recounts a similar experiment in which people were asked to rate obscure works by well-known poets. His typically acerbic conclusion was that "many people who would describe themselves as lovers of poetry have no more notion of distinguishing between a good poem and a bad one than a 500 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66: 495 These examples point to a more general lesson: word-of-mouth networks cannot be trusted to find the best titles. 19 Readers have always sought out recommendations from friends 20 and scholars have spent the past decade writinff simple computer models to study how this advice percolates through networks? Despite their simglicity, the models make generic predictions that fit sales data remarkably well.
Probably the most important prediction involves growth. The extreme cases are fairly predictable-if the initial number of readers is small, new books have almost no chance of propagating. 23 Conversel,r, books that start out with large numbers of readers quickly become universal? However, the middle ground is more surprising. Here, outcomes are uncertain: everything depends on which readers are randomly selected to "seed" the chain? 5 For most seeds, sales stay small and limited? 6 But a few otherwise unremarkable seeds trigger avalanches that cascade across the network. 27 The lesson is that small differences in how books are launched have large consequences? 8 Two thousand years later, we dog has of arithmetic." George Orwell, As I Please, TRIBUNE (London), May 5, 1944 (2004)). For a comprehensive review of epidemiological models and network theory, see generally Mark E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM REV. 167 (2003) (reviewing recent empirical studies of networked systems). In practice, most simulations rely on a handful of simple parameters including (a) rules for deciding when recommendations are persuasive, (b) the size of the network, (c) the "lag" between the time people start reading and when they communicate recommendations to others, (d) the average size of networks, (e) the size distribution of highly connected sub-networks, and sometimes (f) the presence of unusually persuasive "influentials" and/or unusually persuadable "susceptibles" in society. See Duncan J. Watts & Peter Sherman Dodds, Injluentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 441, 442-43 (2007) 
B. Beyond Computer Models
Computer models are surprisingly lifelike and even explain the role that chance plays in deciding which new books reach consumers. 30 At the same time, they ignore the obvious fact that some works are better than others. This may not matter much for the first few generations of consumers who must decide based on minimal information-a sixty second advertisement, say, or a few lines sampled in a bookstore. But computer models cannot possibly be right once the work has sold so many copies that consumers can get recommendations from friends. At this point, we expect word of mouth networks to recommend good works much more often than the computer models predict. The importance of this effect varies by industry. For example, book titles can take years to reach bestseller status. 31 This gives word of mouth ample time to correct first impressions. Conversely, Hollywood deliberately suppresses word of mouth by releasing new movies onto as many screens as possible. 32 This helps bad films do better in the first week while increasing the number of people who can give word of mouth advice thereafter. Both factors accelerate the rate at which the market embraces or rejects new films. 33 Computer models also ignore production costs. For example, two-fifths (39.2 percent) of all Amazon book sales involve titles ranked at l 00,000 or higher. 34 Prior to the Digital Age, scale economies ensured that many specialized titles had too little demand to be profitable 35 Finally, computer models assume that consumers are passive and cannot find works for themselves. This has never been entirely true, as anyone who has rummaged through a used bookstore knows. Online book, music, and video archives have made the task even easier. 38 Despite this, individual search remains marginal. One reason for this is that it is uncoordinated. This means that there is no way to warn others about disappointing titles so that searchers end up reading the same bad books over and over again. Individual search incentives are also fragile. Naively, one expects readers to stop searching as soon as someone suggests better titles than they can find for themselves. 39 This means that government-and commercially-funded searches can crowd out private effoit. 40 We return to this problem in Part VII.C.
C. Doing Better: The Role of Institutions
Word of mouth networks elevate some works at random while overlooking others. This implies that consumers should be willing to pay a premium to support institutions that help the market find better titles. The practical problem is that humans are extraordinarily bad at guessing what other humans like. 41 There are basically two ways to get around this difficulty. 36 . Historic examples include technologies for making cheaper books, continent-wide distribution networks, and shared purchases through libraries. See infra Part IV.
37. For an extended version of this argument, see generally ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 16 (arguing that the Digital Age has allowed niche items to find a market where only 'blockbusters' could survive in the past).
38. See id. at 22-24. 39. Individual search is more resilient where each consumer has slightly different preferences. Cf Joachim Henkel, The Jukebox Mode of Innovation-A Model of Commercial Open Source Development 2-4 (Ctr. Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper No. 4507, 2004) , available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578142 (analyzing open source model where each collaboration member concentrates on whichever project most appeals to her).
40. The principle also applies to non-commercial search collaborations: The more members share good titles, the less incentive they have to try new ones.
41. This makes copyright fundamentally different from patents, whose quality can usually be reduced to a single numerical parameter like "cost savings." See generally John F.R. Harter, The Propensity to Patent with Differentiated Products, 61 S. ECON. J. 195, 200 ( 1994) (arguing that decision to patent is determined by the invention's performance and cost advantages). The Family Feud game show, in which contestants are asked to predict how studio audiences will answer a specific question, presents the phenomenon in miniature. 
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The most familiar response is to hire experts variously called "editors," "producers," and "entertainment executives" to find and publicize new titles. 42 The problem is that expert judgment is remarkably fallible: In screenwriter William Goldman's famous phrase, "Jn]obody knows anything." 43 44. As Clifton Fadiman remarked, the average critic "wouldn't hold his job long" unless his estimates were "appreciab.ly more reliable than those of your dinner-table companion." Clifton Fadiman, The Reviewing Business, HARPER'S, Oct. 1941, at 472, 476 . More careful studies show that the prices that studios pay for scripts have a "positive and significant" correlation to eventual box office revenues. William Goetzmann et a!., The Pricing of Soft and Hard Information: Economic Lessons from Screenplay Sales, 37 J. CULTURAL ECON. 271, 297 (2013 The alternative is to dispense with human experts and collect or infer human judgments directly from audience members. 50 Society has experimented with variations on this strategy since Homer's time. Modem search engines are the iatest incarnation of this approach. 5 1 Finally, effective institutions need to do more than simply predict popular titles; they must also persuade the public to read them. In practice, this means delivering enough initial seed readers to overcome the vagaries of Martial's network. 5 2 This can almost always be done through marketing tactics like advertising or giving away free copies. 53 At the same time, commercial publishers have an obvious incentive to "hype" their own titles. This forces the public to discount all publisher recommendations including the honest ones. 5
Ill. THE FIRST AGE OF SEARCH: A WORLD WITHOUT PRINTING
The earliest literature was based on direct interactions between authors and audiences. 5 5 The introduction of commercial publishing in the first century A.D. I have never had any great respect for the ability of editors, publishers, play and picture producers to guess what the public will like. The record is all against them. I have always tried to put myself in the shoes of the ultimate consumer, the reader, and ignore the middleman. I have assumed that there exists in the country a fairly large group of intelligent people ... who like what I like.
Letter from Raymond Chandler to George Harmon Coxe (Jun. 27, 1940) in SELECTED LETTERS OF RAYMOND CHANDLER 17 (Frank MacShane ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1981 ). 50. See, e.g., David L. Morgan, Focus Groups, 22 ANN. REv. Soc. 129, 133-34 (1996) (discussing the uses of focus groups and surveys). Part 
See infra
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FROM BARDS TO SEARCH ENGINES 505 let ancient society find, manufacture, distribute, and market books on a much larger scale. 56 At the same time, the model was only sustainable so long as publishers could charge markups above the physical cost of copies. 5 7 This meant inventing tough-minded self-help strategies to deter would-be copyists. 58 Even so, the system did almost nothing to protect titles after the first edition. 59 We argue that this apparently minor oversight forced ancient publishers to systematically ignore new authors in favor of "classics" written centuries before. 60
A. Prehistory
The first literature was oral. 61 Homer probably composed the Iliad and Odyssey in the eighth century B.C. 62 However, neither epic was written down for two hundred years. 63 By then, the texts had been refined thousands of times 67 On the other hand, the bards' incremental improvements took centuries to accumulate. 68 This was never going to be good enough for authors who wanted to publish in their own lifetimes. Commercial institutions eventually emerged to fill the gap.
B. Origins of Written Culture
Books were published in Greece as early as the seventh century B.C. 69 At first, the number of physically obtainable titles was so small-some books were published as a single reference cop/ 0 -that readers had no difficulty choosing what to read. However, readers found it much harder to cope once the number of titles grew beyond one thousand or so. 71 Greek society probably reached this point when the orflanized book trade and private libraries appeared early in the fifth century B.C. By the third century B.C., the Great Library of Alexandria had collected most of Greek literature 73 -the equivalent of perhaps 20,000 modem paperbacks 74 -in a single location. , 190, 190 (1998) . 
71.
It takes modern readers roughly five hours to read the average book. Impressive and Amusing Facts, TREDITION CLASSICS (Sept. 2, 2012) , http://web.archive.org/web/ 20120920002406/http://www.tredition.com/odd-facts (accessed by searching for Tredition in the Internet Archive Index). Assuming eight-hour days without vacations, this comes to about 30,000 volumes over fifty years. A better estimate would allow. for the fact that most real readers have day jobs, but can also skim or discard many texts immediately. No matter how the arithmetic is done, it is hard to see how the average human can perform reasonable searches once the number of titles passes I 0,000 or so. That said, one scholar claimed to have read every Greek text in existence as late as the second century B.C. LIONEL CASSON, LIBRARIES IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 38 (2001 Commercial scribes copied these texts for clients across the Empire. 75 Readers could now obtain any title they wanted. The problem was knowing what to ask for. For the most part, searches were performed by noncommercial literary circles whose members identified, advised, and publicized deserving authors. 76 This continued the Homeric pattern of letting audiences improve titles. Like modem samizdat, circle members also manufactured most of their own books. 77 Whatever its defects, the method was wonderfully sincere. 78 The bare fact that a book existed showed that someone, somewhere, had thought it h . 79 wort copymg.
C. The First Commercial Publishers.
Samizdat-style production relied on amateurs to make one-off copies. Such methods could not possibly support specialization or economies of scale. Roman society responded by organizing commercial publishing firms that used high markups to pay employees. But for the new business model to work, publishers had to find a way to suppress copyists. In practice, we argue that the Romans were never able to protect books beyond the first edition. This crippled search and reinforced the ancient world's notorious preference for long-dead authors.
The first unmistakable references to commercial book manufacturing date from the first century A.D. 80 Scholars have argued about the industry's size for RENAISSANCE !53 (1991) ("[T]he library of Alexandria ... was said to have housed seven hundred thousand volumes. Even if one book filled four or five rolls ... or if Alexandrians exaggerated their library's size, it was still a large collection.").
75. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 20. Availability improved further in the 2d Century as new libraries brought physical copies closer to readers. The Pergamum in Asia Minor possessed at least 200,000 works. CASSON, supra note 71, at 48-52; HOWARD, supra note 74, at 20. Fragmentary evidence suggests that many cities built smaller libraries that offered standard works. See generally CASSON, supra note 71, at 57-58 (summarizing archeological evidence for donor-supported libraries more than a century. 81 However, there can be no doubt that figures like Horace (d. 8 B.C.), Martial (d. 104 A.D.), and Quintillian (d. 100 A.D.) were celebrities whose works were sold throughout the Empire. 82 Indeed, Pliny the Younger tells of "a rustic Spaniard who traveled to Rome just to catch a glimpse of Livy [d. 17 A.D.] ." 83 It is hard to imagine such fame without well-funded marketing and distribution programs. 84 Publishers also performed modest search and marketing tasks, including payin~ authors for desirable manuscripts 85 and handing out complimentary copies. 6 All of these tasks required a substantial commercial sector.
Commercial firms could also produce large book "runs" more cheaply than any amateur. 87 Anyone who has copied text longhand knows how easy it is to book manufacturing may have existed in 4th Century B.C. Greece and 1st Century B.C. Rome). See also GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES vii (2d ed. 1896) (arguing that the Augustan age .copied and distributed literature "under an effective publishing and bookselling machinery, so as to reach an extensive and widely separated reading public."). 81. Scholars have debated whether commercial publishing was "fairly marginal or not" since the 19th Century. Iddeng, supra ~ote 80, at 73. Most older scholarship argues that the industry resembled modem publishing. Scholars writing since the 1960s usually stress that that the evidence is compatible with smaller enterprises. Professor Iddeng concludes that the truth lies in between but that non-commercial copying remained "the usual way of acquiring literature." /d. at 76. But see A VRIN, supra note 76, at 170 ("[F]or late republican and early imperial Rome, one can speak confidently of publishing as big business.").
82. See lddeng, supra note 80, at 68 (citing Seneca, de beneficiis 7.6; Martial, epigrammata 4.72, 13.2).
83. /d. at 77 (citing Letter from Pliny the Younger, to Nepos, available at http://www .fordham.edulhalsall/ancient/pliny-letters.asp ).
84. As Prof. Iddeng remarks, the Livy story "could only be told in a society where literature was distributed far more broadly than within a small erudite urban elite." /d. See also AVRIN, supra note 74, at 170 ("The vast amount of literary production in all parts of the Roman Empire ... implies an active profession of publishers and booksellers."); WILLIAM A. JOHNSON, BOOKROLLS AND SCRIBES IN OXYRHYNCHUS 158 (2004) (quoting HARRY Y. GAMBLE, BOOKS AND READERS IN THE EARLY CHURCH: A HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN TEXTS 88 (1995)) ("[A] bookseller would have found his best opportunities in a reading public that lay beyond aristocratic and scholarly literary circles and in provincial areas where books were otherwise hard to come by.").
85. Ancient sources contain various references to authors selling works to publishers. See lddeng, supra note 80, at 73-75 (citations omitted); RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 8 (1912). However, contemporary scholars are often skeptical. The main sticking point seems to be author complaints like Martial's joke that his "wallet doesn't notice." Idding, supra note 80, at 75 (citing Martial, epigrammata 2.3.6). This argument seems doubtful since modem authors say much the same thing. Even today, only one in every thousand authors who contact a literary agent ends up earning more than symbolic income. John Eggan, The Truth About Book Royalties (June 2, 2009), http://ezinearticles.com/?The-Truth-About-Book-Royalties&id=2424907.
86. PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 189 (stating that publishers maintained a "record of complimentary copies").
87. See, e.g., Iddeng, supra note 80, at 75 (describing financial gain from using dictation to make multiple copies at once). For the modem literature on dictation, see JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 39-41. 509 lose one's place. This made it faster and more efficient to hire readers so that scribes could write from dictation. 88 The fact that many-but not all-ancient texts suffer from homonym errors shows that this method was widely used. 89 At the same time, dictation was inefficient for small production runs. In practice, ancient publishers probably produced twenty to fifty books at a time. 90 Twenty copies may not seem like much. But even modem "superstores" seldom stock more than a dozen copies of any one title. In order to use dictation at all, then, book manufacturers would have had to build distribution markets across Rome or, better still, the entire Empire. 91 Scholars have found considerable evidence that they did. 92 The converse is also true. Dictation disappeared when Rome fell and only reafpeared when medieval universities created a suitably large replacement market.
Roman jurists knew copyright as a "theoretical speculation" but never implemented it. 94 This has led most scholars to assume that ancient publishers could not charge for content. 95 However, classical references describe publishers 88. !d. at 67 (remarking that dictation is "obviously more efficient"). 89. See PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 120. More recent scholars generalize the homonym insight by distinguishing between "visual" and "aural" errors buttressed by evidence from other primitive societies, theoretical arguments about the relative efficiency of dictation, oblique literary references, and pictorial evidence that Egyptian scribes sat in a cross-legged posture that made visual copying awkward. For the leading modern review, see THEODORE CRESSY SKEAT, THE USE OF DICTATION IN ANCIENT BOOK- PRODUCTION (1956) , reprinted in THE COLLECTED BIBLICAL WRITINGS OF T.C. SKEAT 3-32 (J.K. Elliot ed., 2004); see also JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 21-22, 39-41. These necessarily inferential arguments make it hard to estimate the relative cost of producing texts by each method.
90. The lower limit was set by efficiency. Assuming, arguendo, that dictation makes each copyist ten percent more efficient, manufacturers would have to sell at least ten copies to cover the cost of hiring a read.er. The upper limit was set by the publisher's ability to supply scribes and working space. Medieval manuscript shops are known to have employed at least fifty scribes at a time. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 29. 91. This is still true today. Despite nationwide sales, most debut fiction only sells about I 0,000 copies. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, The Future of the Book: Authors Feel Pinch in Age of£-Books, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ SBI0001424052748703369704575461542987870022. 92. See PUTNAM, supra note 80, at vii. Iddeng, supra note 80, at 68, 71 (citing Martial, eprigramatta 5.5., 7.17, 1.29, 1.38, 1.52, 1.53, 1.63, 1.66, 1.72, 2.6, 2.20, 11.94, 12.63; Quintillian, institutio oratia l.pr.7) (arguing that Horace, Martial, and Quintillian enjoyed empire-wide sales).
93. See PUTNAM, supra note 80, at 66. Prof. Skeat argues that some early medieval manuscripts show evidence of dictation but that visual copying became the medieval nolm. SKEAT, supra note 89, at 24-27.
94. See Durantaye, supra note 76, at 38. PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 268 (Roman jurists treated copyright as a "theoretical speculation" but passed no legislation to enact it). The Roman jurist Gaius (second century A.D.) argued that an artist who painted a picture on a tabletop possessed a superior right to the property. The opinion was later endorsed by Tribonian (d. 547). BOWKER, supra note 85, at 8. 95. More precisely, publishers could not recover fixed costs like paying royalties to the author, searching for lost texts, or editing corrupted passages. They could, however, have recovered variable costs like proof-reading or updating texts to include the author's latest revisions. Publishers with a reputation for quality could also have commanded an "efficiency wage" over and above their 510 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:495 paying authors for manuscripts, 96 granting booksellers the exclusive right to sell certain poems, 97 and handing out complimentary copies to select readers. 98 None of this would have been possible without at least some ability to deter 0 99 copytsts.
One explanation is that publishers with big distribution networks could achieve economies of scale that no local copyist could match. Theory suggests that they could have earned profits comparable to the resulting cost advantage over smaller competitors.
100 This would have supported a very modest budget for marketing and search. In fact, ancient publishers possessed a more powerful strategy. Ancient sources frequently mention publishers J?roducing large numbers of unsold copies or, in today's jargon, "remainders." 1 1 This seems inexplicable-in a world without copyright, markups should have been so small that discarding just one or editing costs. See Shapiro, supra note 42, at 659. The fact that the Roman publisher Atticus (d. 32 B.C.) became a byword for quality in an otherwise shoddy industry supports this theory. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & WILSON, supra note 70, at 24 (stating that Atticus' "standards of execution were of the highest and his name a guarantee of quality.").
96. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 97. BOWKER, supra note 85, at 8. 98. PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 189. 99. Traditional explanations are unsatisfactory. Some classics scholars have suggested that large book runs would have allowed manufacturers to charge a premium for "hot" titles. Iddeng, supra note 80, at 75. However, such premiums should have been miniscule in a world where copyists could quickly flood the market with copies. Other scholars have argued that publishers did not want to run the "dreadful risk of not having enough copies to meet the immediate demand." PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 223. But this "risk" similarly makes no sense unless publishers could extract markups from future sales.
100. This is a familiar result in so-called Bertrand models of competition. See generally Bertrand Competition, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_competition (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) ("If one firm has lower average cost (a superior production technology) it will charge the highest price that is lower than the average cost and take all the business. This is known as 'limit pricing."').
I 0 I. Scattered references to books being recycled as packing paper or fish-wrap might possibly be explained as literary taunts. For example, Catullus uses the fish wrap insult against his .literary rival Volusius. Durantaye, supra note 76, at 51 (citing Persius, satirae 1.41-43). Even so, the explanation is problematic. In order to be effective, an insult must be comprehensible. This suggests that the fish wrap outcome happened often enough for Catullus' audience to recognize the practice. Ancient writers also describe much larger numbers of books being burnt to heat public baths. PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 223 (citing GEORGE AUGUSTUS SIMCOX, A HISTORY OF LATIN LITERATURE: FROM ENNIUS TO BOETHIUS 244 (1883)) ("[L]arge supplies of surplus stock found their way from the booksellers to the fires of the public baths."). Unsold books were also shipped to distant markets. Durantaye, supra note 76, at 5 I. Modem publishers still dispose of their defective print runs this way. See Edition (book}, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edition_(book) (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). Finally, publishers seem to have held some unsold titles for long periods. PUTNAM, supra note 12, at I 88-89 (referring to publisher's unsold inventory of Ciceoro's Ligarian Oration).
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FROM BARDS TO SEARCH ENGfNES 511 two copies would have been ruinous. 102 According to this logic, no publisher should ever have produced a copy until the publisher was certain of selling it.
Far from being irrational, this Article argues that publishers used deliberately large inventories to deter copyists. To see how, begin with the special case where everyone knows that the public will buy exactly one hundred copies of a particular title. Suppose further that the publisher manufactures all one hundred copies immediately. Now imagine that a copyist creates the copyist's own unauthorized copy. At this point the copyist and the publisher will immediately realize (a) that someone will be stuck with an unsold copy, and (b) that it is far better to sell the extra copy at a loss than to receive no payment at all. These conditions guarantee that the unauthorized copr will lose money. Knowing this, the copyist will never produce the book at all. 1 3 In practice, of course, no publisher could predict sales so perfectly. Even so, the ability to markup prices would have given the publisher a cushion for unsold books. More than that, the publisher would have expected remainders. After all, the whole point of markups was to charge a monopoly price that would depress sales from one hundred to perhaps ninety-five copies. Far from losing money, publishers would have seen the five remaindered books as a kind of fee for suppressing copyists.
Did Roman merchants really understand the economics of this scheme? Classic "invisible hand" logic suggests that they did not have to. All that was required was for one or two copyists to go broke competing with a first edition. After that, merchants would know better.
D. Was Ancient Search Efficient?
This Article's deterrence argument suggests that publishers could protect content by producing large first edition inventories. This had several good features. First and most obviously, it generated enough surplus to support distribution and search. Second, a deterrent must be visible. This would have forced publishers to display their inventories and provided a powerful signal of quality. Unlike verbal assurances, readers could not dismiss this physical investment as hype. 104 Finally, deterrence would have ended as soon as the first I 02. The modest economies of scale available from dictation do not materially change this result. Assuming a "print run" of thirty books, the savings from a ten percent gain in each scribe's efficiency would be erased if just two books remained unsold.
103. Prof. Mark Schankerman (personal communication) points out that the argument is closely related to so-called "capacity deterrence" games in which the first firm to enter a new industry makes deliberately large investments in plant and equipment to deter later entrants. See, e.g 106. Cf Elie, supra note 18 (suggesting that publishing is a "winner-take-all game" in which I 0 books out of I 00 may be successful); Hotz, supra note 48 (stating that only one in ten songs earns a profit).
107. Because dictation was only profitable above some minimal scale, copies of Homer and the classics would have been cheaper than new titles.
108. See PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 248 (describing government financial support for literature).
109. See, e.g., CASSON, supra note 71, at 56 ("To be sure, one of the reasons for the many finds of [Homer and Euripides] is that both were used in the schoolroom, so a multitude of student copies must have existed"). The Church later expanded the canon by subsidizing the copying of selected Christian titles. George Haven Putnam, Books and Their Makers in the Middle Ages, supra at 77-78 (explaining how a sense of religious duty spurred medieval copyists to produce enormous numbers of church texts century. Remarkably, almost all of them had died four or five centuries earlier. Similar patterns can be found in Greek library records. 112 Did commercial publishing cause this debacle? The alternative explanations are weak. Probably the most plausible is that fourth century writers were simply more talented than their successors. According to this theory, Homer's dominance is not very different from Shakespeare's. 113 But this fails to explain the very different fate of second tier authors. According to the ancient pattern, American best seller lists should still be dominated by Marlowe and Lovelace. Instead, they reflect authors in every generation from Charles Dickens to S h K . 114 tep en mg.
The other possibility is that elites suppressed new authors. The fact that modem professors still end their Western Civilization courses in 1939 suggests . that elites are indeed conservative. 115 The real issue, however, is less whether ancient elites were conservative than whether they could impose their tastes on others. Today's scholars have done little to nothing to stop commercial publishing's rush to low quality, vulgar titles. 116 Roman publishers could be similarly unscrupulous when there was money to be made. 117 Why were the outcomes so different?
Finally, neither hypothesis explains why the Greeks' literary Golden Age only happened once. This is especially mysterious since similarly unique Golden Ages appear in Roman 118 112. The same third and fourth century B.C. authors continued to dominate the Oxyrhynchus data until the Arab invasions at the end of the 7th century. Similar patterns can also be found in Greek library catalogs. One fragmentary list shows two-dozen titles by Euripides, a dozen by Sophocles (d. 405 B.C.) 114. Shakespeare's nearest all-time competitors include Barbara Cartland (500-1 bn), Danielle Steele (500-800m), Harold Robbins (750m), Georges Simenon (500-700m), Sidney Sheldon (370-600m), Enid Blyton (300-600m), and Dr. Seuss (l00-500m). Non-twentieth century authors who probably sold more than one hundred million copies include Charles Dickens, Jane Austen, Alexandre Dumas (pere), Victor Hugo, and Jules Verne. The dominance of nineteenth and twentieth century authors clearly reflects the explosive growth of book manufacturing since 1800. A more refined analysis would correct for this and make earlier authors more visible. Commercial bookmakers reemerged at the end of the twelfth century to serve the new universities. 130 By the late Middle A~es, demand had recovered to the point where publishers reintroduced dictation. 13 Together with falling labor and materials costs 132 this reduced book prices so that the public demanded more titles. By the fifteenth century, commercial book producers had expanded beyond universities to serve the general public. 133 Meanwhile, international book fairs 134 restored the old Europe-wide market. 135 Catalogs for the Frankfurt fair listed twenty thousand titles in the last third of the sixteenth century 136 enough to fill the entire Library of Alexandria.
B. Printing and After.
The printing press was invented in 1450 137 and had spread across Europe by 1465. 138 The new technology offered spectacular economies of scale, and large print runs could cut unit costs by fifty percent. 139 However, early runs averaged just two to three hundred copies and barely broke even. 140 Because of scale economies, the big publishers could sell books more cheaply than any local competitor. 145 This priced copyists out of the market and let the big publishers pocket their cost advantage as profit. 146 Would-be copyists fought back in two ways. First, they ,groduced down-market substitutes like abridgments and low quality editions. 1 7 This avoided ruinous head-to-head competition while peeling off readers who might otherwise have paid full price. 148 Second, local printers lobbied their governments to exclude foreign competitors. 149 Unsurprisingly, the new laws were bad for consumers. Lacking economies of scale, domestic books were often expensive and badly made. 150 Legislation and piracy notwithstanding, the big Dutch publishers must have done a good job of suppressinf copyists since they often earned two to three times their production costs. 15 Publishers used this revenue to recoup the massive costs of locating and correcting ancient manuscripts 152 and to pay royalties that made top authors "substantially independent." 153 The Dutch publishing empire dominated Europe for nearly two hundred years. 154 However, it depended on being able to sell the same Latin-language 145. The big publishers also had to suppress competitiOn among themselves. This was relatively easy in an era when cartel agreements could be enforced in court. BOWKER, supra note 85, at I 0-11 (describing fifteenth century German cartel agreements); SHER, supra note I, at 26 (describing how London's elite publishers used "mutual compacts" to enforce extralegal "honorary copyright" in the eighteenth century); Isabella Alexander, All Change for the Digital Economy: Copyright and Business Models in the Early Eighteenth Century, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1351, 1357-58 (20 I 0) (describing London publishers' use of "conger" agreements to cartelize sales).
146. In theory, publishers could also have extended their monopoly past the first edition by storing and re-using their typeset frames. In practice, this was hardly ever done. JAN Ancient book manufacturing had been scattered across thousands of scribes. Like modem samizdat, this would have been nearly impossible to stamp out. 159 Print technology was different; its scale economies ensured that presses were few in number and also too valuable to risk confiscation. This created a target for regulation. Strangely, the earliest copyright laws focused on censorship and ignored economic incentives. 160 To the extent that the laws had any economic purpose at all, they rewarded foreign printers for introducing the new technology and shielded local printers fn;>m imports. 161
The increase in piracy after 1650 changed all that. would succeed. The Statute of Anne produced an explosion of publishing, 168 leading to a fourfold increase in English titles by the 1780s. 169 Falling production costs in the nineteenth and twentieth century 170 led to more demand, more titles, and more search problems.
Copyists had long specialized in producing down-market versions of popular titles. 17 Copyright let publishers invade this business, 172 allowing them to charge high prices to readers who wanted the durability and beauty of a first edition and low prices to everyone else. 173 Twentieth century publishers updated the practice b)' launching paperback editions a year or so after initial, hardback publication. 17 [n both cases, the tactic increased publisher profits while offering low prices to readers who would otherwise have been priced out of the market. This softened copyright's downside and enhanced its social efficiency. The physical costs of making and storing books were also important. Even though they suppressed readership, they were surprisingly helpful for search. This Article has already argued that Roman consumers would have seen large bookstore inventories as evidence of quality. 175 Early modem readers extended this logic by asking how many times publishers had typeset new editions 176 or how many copies stores bought for their shelves.
168. See SHER, supra note I, at 2; Alexander, supra note 114, at 1355 (publications grew two percent per annum from 1740 to 1800).
169. Laura Boyle, Subscription Libraries and the Rise of Popular Fiction, JANE AUSTIN.CO.UK (June 20, 2011 (the last two decades of the eighteenth century resulted in a 400 percent increase in book publishing), available at, http://www.janeausten.co.uk/subscriptionlibraries-and-the-rise-of-popular-fiction/.
170. New inventions cut paper costs by 30 percent in 180 I although UK taxes kept paper prices high until 1861. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 125. Automated machinery increased the rate at which printers could set type from 6,000 characters per hour in 1840 to 10,000 characters at the end of the century. /d. at 128. 171. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 101. 172. Publishers usually sold large format "quartos" to wealthy patrons and then waited several years before publishing cheaper "octavo" editions. See SHER, supra note I, at 82-83.
173. Readers' refusal to wait for cheap editions provides a striking example of the "Pac-Man Conjecture" in economics, i.e. that durable goods monopolists can exercise price discrimination by reducing prices over time. Publishers and bookstores also incurred significant storage costs. 177 Indeed, eighteenth century bookshops were piled to the rafters with unsold inventory. 178 By the late twentieth century superstores typically stocked about one hundred and fifty thousand titles, 179 most of which sold less than one copy per quarter. 180 This forced stores to continually reevaluate the chances of selling a title against returning it to the publisher. Publishers were similarly forced to decide whether returned books should be stored or destroyed. 181 These decisions made the presence of a title on store shelves or publisher backlists a powerful recommendation.
But physical costs also limited the time that slow-selling titles could remain on the market. The dilemma was especially sharp for movies. Most theaters must attract seven hundred and fifty viewers per week to earn a profit. 182 Early twentieth century studios owned their own theaters and could ignore this constraint if they thought a title would catch on. 183 183. Raymond Chandler argued that the system ensured that the public would watch anything the studios produced: In one novel, Chandler's hero runs into a sinister mogul who explains the system:
The motion picture business is the only business in the world in which you can make all the mistakes there are and still make money . Modem copyright gave publishers a powerful incentive to find titles that pleased consumers. This was true even when they had to share the reward with other institutions.
A. Publishers and Editors
Early printers earned slim profits 185 and needed outside financing to cover the large up-front costs of printing. 186 This gave investors, soon to be known as publishers, the power to decide which books would be printed.
187
The early modem print era featured falling costs and bigger distribution networks. 188 The emergence of modem copyright statutes that extended protection beyond the first edition made these gambles much more favorable. By the eighteenth century, publishers were earning most of their profits on just one-third of their titles. 193 One way to reduce risk was to make Martial's market less fickle. This meant picking good titles and seeding the market with enough readers to get a I 85. Printing was highly competitive since presses were relatively cheap and could be rented. See FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 136, at 110. At the end of the fifteenth century there were approximately sixty printers in Paris and forty presses in Lyon. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 50.
186. See FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 136, at 115. 187. One popular eighteenth century model tried to limit publishers' role by raising start-up money directly from readers. The subscribers were later allowed to buy the book at a deep discount. HOWARD, supra note 74, at 96. Twenty-first century studios have revived the model to "crowdsource" movie financing. See generally Lucas Shaw, Warner Bros. to RefUnd Angry Veronica Mars Contributors, THE WRAP (March 15, 2014) , http://www.thewrap.com/wamer-brosrefund-veronica-mars-contributors-download.-flixster -ultraviolet-prob !ems/( describing "crowdfunded" movie "Veronica Mars") 188. See generally Raven, supra note 168, at 85 ("[P]opular literature was reduced in price by the mass production and reprinting of books and magazines in the late eighteenth century, and even more notably after the advent of steam-powered printing in the early nineteenth century .... ").
189. The process was reversed during the Second World War, when paper rationing slashed the number of books that publishers could offer. en as now, t. e campaigns were timed to peak when the book reached store shelves. 196 After that, wise publishers let "big talkers and social networks," who were far more trusted than any newspaper ad, spread the word. 197 Plainly, the strategy worked because twentieth century authors routinely accepted lower royalties to work with publishers who could get the authors' works noticed. 198 Publishers also helped authors write better books. By the eighteenth century publishers were hiring expert "literary counsellors" and "triers" to evaluate and sometimes revise potential titles to make them more popular. 199 By the twentieth century, these duties had expanded to include discovering new authors, 200 suggesting improvements, 201 and helping promising authors overcome poor initial sales. The system's beneficiaries included F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, Thomas Wolfe, Alan Paton, James Jones, Isaac Bashevis Singer, Joseph
Brodsky, Nadine Gordimer, Seamus Heaney/ 02 Rin~ Lardner, 203 Raymond Chandler, 204 Anne Tyler, and Elmore Leonard? 0 Determined editors almost certainly saved some of these names from oblivion? 06 194. Cf SHER, supra note I, at 138-39 and 283 (describing how publishers paid bonuses for promising titles and gave free "presentation copies" to influential readers).
195. In the eighteenth century these regularly exceeded fifteen percent of the book's manufacturing costs. SHER, supra note I at supranote 18. 198 . Farrar, Strauss & Girard's titles "became classics in no small part because FSG was the publisher and valued quality over quick profits. Hundreds of authors have passed up more money offered elsewhere to get a piece of the house's prestige and its hands-on approach to editing and publicity." !d.
199. SHER, supra note I, at 283. There were, of course, precedents. The ancient publisher Atticus is said to have provided "all the services of a high-class publisher" including careful revisions, criticism of style or content, discussing the advisability of publication or the suitability of a title, organizing private readings of the new book, sending out complimentary copies, and organizing distribution. REYNOLDS & WILSON, supra note 70, at 24. Editors in the modem sense first appeared in the seventeenth century but were usually friends of the author. Howard, supra note 74, at 94.
200. This process was facilitated by literary agents who were only paid when the author received royalties. The arrangement amounted to a prize system with editors as judges. Ancient publishers sold their books both to individuals and stores. 207 Since the number of first editions was fixed, stores could demand a higher price if a title later became popular. This mini monopoly rewarded stores that tracked their customers' tastes and marketed new titles. 208 By the ei~hteenth century, publishers were selling most of their books through stores. 09 This was efficient since stores possessed information about local readers that no outsider could match. The fact that stores bought books from multiple publishers 210 ~rovided a further assurance that their recommendations were impartial.
11
Early print era publishers took years to organize each new edition. 212 As in Roman times, this meant that stores received part of the publisher's monopoly every time they purchased a book for inventory. This continued until Victorian technology made it easy for publishers to store plates so that new "impressions" could be printed quickly. 213 Twentieth century publishers restored bookstore incentives by offering them a fixed percentage of the suggested retail price.
214
C. Libraries
At first, only wealthy readers could afford books, 215 but this changed when booksellers began renting books to customers in the late seventeenth century? 16 207. AVRIN, supra note 74, at 171. ("In Cicero's day, the first century B.C.E, bookstores were located in the Roman forum .... Even provincial towns like Brindisi, Herda ... Carthage, Lyons and Reims had bookshops anxious to keep up with what was being read in the capital."); IDDENG, supra note 57, at 69 (describing Pliny's pleasure at hearing that his book was for sale in a Lyon store). 208. At the same time, dividing the monopoly between publishers and stores invited a phenomenon that economists call "double marginalization." This led to pathologically high prices that scared off readers and suppressed profits. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL  0RGANIZA TIONS I 74-75(1988 
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The first English circulating library opened in 1730, 217 and there were five hundred and forty of them by the middle of the nineteenth century. 218 These could be commercial, member-owned, 219 or attached to private clubs. 220 Regardless, libraries that provided honest, hi~h quality advice gave more value and could extract higher fees from customers. 21 This was done by hiring clerks who could suggest promising titles to readers. 222 The first nationwide player was called Mudie's Select Library. 223 It dominated the British market from 1842 to 1894. 224 Mudie's could make author reputations faster than any newspaper, 225 and sometimes purchased entire print runs. 226 This gave it more than enough power to overcome the vagaries of Martial's market. Retailers Boots, Harrods, and W.H. Smith replaced Mudie's in the 1890s. 227 Large retailers remained a dominant force in British publishing through the first half of the twentieth century. 228 Americans were wealthier and had less need to pool book purchases; however, they still needed help finding titles. The Book of the Month Club, established in 1926, earned a profit by convincing subscribers that it was "a sound selector of good books" and had 550,000 members by World War II. 222. The most famous clerk was almost certainly George Orwell, who novelized his experiences in Keep the Aspidistra Flying (1939 [VOL. 66: 495 The rise of video stores in the 1980s provides an even closer analogy to British libraries. 230
D. Third Party lnfluencers: Governments, Aristocrats, Scholars, and Critics
Individuals and institutions have always tried to influence authors and public taste. Market forces began to erode these influences in the seventeenth and . h h . 231 e1g teent centunes.
As in Roman times, early modem publishing was heavily dependent on nonmarket actors like schools, 232 patrons, 233 and govemments.Z 34 This gave elites significant leverage over what authors wrote and readers read. 235 This situation changed in the eighteenth century when deserving authors began finding sinecures in universities or the church. 236 The new institutional arrangement insulated authors from day-to-day interference and gave them more room to follow their conscience. 237 At the same time, it also made it easier for them to pursue market signals from publishers and the book-buying public. (last updated Aug. I, 2013) . The difference today is that textbooks have almost no sales or cultural impact in the wider society.
233. The great majority of authors have always needed-and still need-Qutside income to write. Aristocratic patrons filled this gap from Roman times to the seventeenth century. JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 42-56; Anthology of English Literature: Edmund Spenser, LUMINARIUM, http://www.luminarium.org/renlit/spensbio.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (listing English poet Edmund Spenser's patrons); PUTNAM, supra note 80, at 377-88 (discussing the importance of Italian, French, and English patrons to early printers).
234. Government support remained important into early modem times, especially in France. PUTNAM, supra note 80, at 378.
235. See generally id. at 377-78 (discussing the influence and support of wealthy patrons, universities, and governments on early printing).
236. The sinecures typically included jobs in government, universities, and the church. SHER, supra note I, at 205, 208-09. The transition was less abrupt than it seems since many eighteenth century appointments were controlled by influential aristocrats. !d.
237. See id. at 209. 238. See generally id. at 260--61 (discussing how "enlightened patronage" allowed authors the freedom to rely on support from publishers and the public).
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The rise of newspapers in the seventeenth century 239 made market forces even more influential. Newspapers understood that their revenues depended on providing value to readers, and this included giving readers reliable advice about titles that would please them. 240 The explosion of titles following the Statute of Anne led to specialized journals-such as the Monthly Review--to help the public find books.Z 41 Elites fought back by publicizing their own tastes through book prizes.Z 42 These also contained a market component, however, since prizes that failed to boost sales were less prestigious. 243 
VI. THE THIRD AGE OF SEARCH: THE STORY So FAR
The rise of the Internet radically expanded book markets. 244 As always, more sales meant more titles. By 2003, Amazon readers had more than 2.3 million titles to choose from. 245 The introduction of e-books accelerated the trend by reducing publishers' overhead costs.Z 46 The resulting proliferation of titles made the search problem even worse. Despite revolutionary online tools, search institutions have failed to keep _up.
A. Reconnecting With Audiences
The rise of movies in the early twentieth century encouraged publishers to find new ways of picking winners. Moviemaking requires teams of artists who frequently disagree about creative choices. In principle, financiers, now called "studios" and "producers," 247 could break the deadlock 248 by deciding which 526 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66: 495 artists were right. 249 Not surprisingly, moviemakers began searching for less subjective methods for deciding what audiences wanted. By the early twentieth century, Hollywood was developing survey methods that showed test audiences "sneak previews" of new movies.Z 50 The studios used this information to cut or add scenes that would make the movie more lucrative. However, it was hard to recruit viewers who matched the self-selected audiences that would actually come to see the film. 251 This sometimes produced spectacular mistakes. 252 Television evaded this restriction by showing sample programs, called pilots, to the entire population. 253 In theory, this let twentieth century television executives reach more viewers in a single evening than Homer had in centuries.Z 54 Unlike Homer's audiences, however, television viewers were little more than passive surveillance targets. This made their input much less valuable.Z 55 Consumers were similarly hungry for objective measures of quality. Twentieth century publishers responded by compiling bestseller lists for books, weekend box office reports for movies, and Top 40 playlists for music. But the system was unreliable. After all, most sales reported purchasin~ decisions made by consumers who had not yet read the book or seen the movie. 56 This allowed of readers, elicit new ideas, 273 and market new titles. 274 The only place where crowdsourcing has failed is in the area of authorship. Even in the Digital Age, the old arguments against screenwriting by committee still hold. 275 Given enough computing power, publishers can dispense with markets and target individuals directly.Z 76 This is nothing new since even Roman bookstores must have made a point of knowing their readers. The difference today is that this can be done for millions of readers at a time. The new data is also more intimate since e-booksellers like Barnes & Noble or Amazon are notified each time readers tum a page, insert a bookmark, or highlight text. 277 This tells them which titles are devoured, skimmed, or ignored and is only a short step from knowing how much consumers would pay for titles in the first place.
When information about individuals is limited, publishers must fall back on other methods that gather data for well-defined groups. Falling information costs have made it easy to collect monitoring and surveying data for movies 278 and books 279 in unprecedented detail. Content providers have even used [VOL. 66: 495 physiological data to discover preferences that viewers are not consciously aware f 280 o.
D. The Crisis
Printing technologies introduced large scale economies which ensured that pirates would be (a) few in number and (b) possess enough capital to fear court judgments. This provided an easy target for copyright and judicial enforcement. Today, however, nearly anyone can copy and share documents at a near-zero cost. Furthermore, the profits earned by the average copyist are much too small to justify a lawsuit. This makes enforcement nearly impossible.Z 81 Together, these developments threaten to choke off the revenue that used to pay editors for search. In principle, radically new and more efficient information technologies could pick up the slack. In practice, the available evidence suggests that search is markedly less capable than it was a few years ago.
The decline of copyright has clearly eroded many search institutions. For example, there are now fewer brick and mortar stores where consumers can sample books and music.Z 82 Similarly, tighter Hollywood budgets have eliminated programs that used to search for new story ideas.Z 83 In principle, new electronic search tools could compensate for these losses. However, today's unknown authors typically sell fewer e-books than hardcovers, 284 despite the fact that the latter cost twice as much. 285 This strongly suggests that online search is less effective than traditional methods, particularly for unknown authors.Z 86 There is also a market test. In 2010, Amazon let authors post new books for sale directly onto its website without a publisher. 287 Despite generous revenue sharing, the initiative collapsed.Z 88 Plainly, authors did not see online tools as an acceptable substitute for editors. 280 . Emory University scientists claim that brainwave activity can predict hit songs even when listeners consciously dislike the tune. See Hotz, supra note 48.
281. In principle, the situation can be retrieved by imposing outsized, in terrorem fines on randomly chosen offenders. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) . But this approach is constitutionally doubtful and ultimately threatens the political consensus for copyright itself. Meanwhile, publishers have become markedly less adventurous. Today's ebook sales are slanted toward brand name authors/ 89 while movie sales are dominated by blockbusters that exploit the name recognition of existing movies, comic books, and toys. 290 This process of selecting projects because they are already well known is disturbingly Roman. Some publishing executives have even started to denigrate the twenty-first century's proliferation of titles as "clutter." 291 This is just another way of saying that readers cannot sort through the choices for themselves-and that existing search institutions have failed.
VII. THEW A Y FORWARD
Martial's fickle market cannot be trusted to find the best books. Over the years, society has developed various institutional fixes. 292 The Homeric system revised texts through direct interactions between authors and audiences. 293 This produced great literature, but was painfully slow. The second, Library of Alexandria strategy left book production to scholars, monks, aristocrats, and government elites. This did little to find new books, especially by outsiders. Finally, commercial publishers hired expert editors to find and promote titles that readers would like. This market solution supported a vibrant array of search institutions throughout the Age of Print.
But commercial publishing is vulnerable to copyists. Indeed, the Roman example shows how even modest gaps in protection can cripple search. Modem copyright fixed the problem by extending protection beyond first editions, 294 but this protection is quickly eroding. The Digital Age urgently needs new solutions.
There are three possibilities. First, commercial publishers can try to replace copyright with technical protections that raise pirates' copying costs. Second, firms can reorganize the commercial system around new players that are less vulnerable to piracy. Finally, society can dump commercial editors and return to the Homeric pattern of harvesting judgment directly from audiences. Technical protections have kept copying costs high for software and games. 295 But books-and to a lesser extent music and movies-must be produced in a format that can be read by humans. For this reason, no technical protection can prevent Roman-style scribes from copying an e-book for about $1,000. 296 This implies that publishers can earn no more than a few thousand dollars per title 297 -at least an order of magnitude less than the $30,000 to $80,000 that some of today's physical books earn to support editors, marketing, and search.Z 98 In fact, the froblem is worse than that. Since roughly one in fifteen books earns a profit, 29 pirates can usually increase profit by limiting themselves to titles that have already become popular in the marketplace. However, spotting 533 winners takes time. This means that pirates will usually enter the market too late to match the original publisher's revenues. Even so, the net impact is disastrous. Suppose that the original publisher is lucky enough to earn $10,000 on the fifteenth book. Because the first fourteen books earned little or nothing, this still comes to just $667 per book-a fivefold decrease from the naive estimate. This reintroduces the old Roman first edition problem with a vengeance.
These arguments suggest that technical protections cannot support human editors at anything like twentieth century levels. However, they might still be useful for products like software and video games that are only partly humanreadable. Here, publishers should be able to recover their production costs plus a substantial margin. 300 Movies and music provide an intermediate case.
B. The Return of Self-Help: Digital Bookstores
Copyright is fading. At the same time, the old self-help methods based on physical copying costs are as dead as Martial himself. 301 This Article argues that digital publishers' only remaining self-help option is to leverage the industry's comparative advantage in search.
Consider, for concreteness, an online digital bookstore where patrons can find and purchase books regardless of publisher. Whatever its limitations, the facility possesses one striking advantage compared to its brick and mortar predecessors. If it wants to, it can show each consumer an entirely different set of shelves and recommended titles. Exploiting this advantage gives online bookstores an enormous incentive to find books that consumers actually want.
How much revenue could a large digital bookstore extract from search? The answer depends on how many consumers (a) rely on the digital bookstore to discover new titles, and then (b) purchase the titles at marked up prices.
The first factor will normally depend on the store's comparative advantage in finding titles. To the extent this depends on search engines, a large digital bookstore should be able to provide better recommendations than any . 302 competttor.
300. First-mover advantages will normally encourage second-comers to avoid head-to-head competition in favor of variant products tailored to previously underserved users. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Commission However, human judgment is also important. To become dominant, a digital bookstore must find some way to ·merge automated search engine inferences with traditional editing judgments. Simply hiring human editors to adjust search engine rankings will not work; indeed, it would only revive the old Hollywood problem of deciding which experts were right. A much better strategy would be for the bookstore to buy editing judgments from outside firms. This can be done by showing publishers machine-generated rankings and letting them pay for the right to push favored titles higher up the list. 303 Significantly, Google already sells ads this way. 304 This kind of business model is bound to be controversial. Indeed, both the United States Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission have already investigated Goo~le for adjusting machine rankings to make its own products more prominent. 05 While both proceedings were later dropped/ 06 this is hardly reassuring. The better answer is that publishers have always tried to outguess Martial's fickle market. Paying the digital bookstore to overrule machine-generated rankings is no different from investing money in advertising or complimentary copies. If the publisher guesses wrong, the book will never be popular and the publisher will lose her investment. If the publisher guesses right, the machine-generated rank was wrong from the start.
The fact that consumers can be persuaded to use a digital bookstore for search only matters if they stay long enough to buy books. This depends on how 535 easily they can find cheap pirated editions elsewhere. 307 We expect rational consumers to pay a per-title markup equal to: Assuming that readers earn the average US wage of $24.53 per hour 308 and can investigate two "hits" per minute we have: The first term clearly depends on current search engine efficiency. However there is also a fundamental limit. This Article has argued that rational pirates are unlikely to copy every book. 309 This guarantees that many searches will fail and that rational readers should always be willing to pay a markup.
This kind of self-help scheme is bound to be weaker than copyright. Most notably, our analysis depends on pirates' reluctance to copy every title. But consumers can be reasonably sure that bestsellers will be copied. This suggests that the digital bookstore's margin for trendy books will be small so that publishers will have much less incentive to find new authors. That said, the loss is smaller than it seems. Today's publishers re-invest most of their bestseller revenues in marketing blockbusters that the public already knows about. 310 This is wasteful and contributes little to search. 311 Our analysis suggests that a digital bookstore can extract substantial markups for the foreseeable future. In the long run, however, at least three threats are likely. First, this Article has argued that readers are more willing to search for illicit copies when piracy is common. 312 This implies that each pirate's decision to copy a title benefits all pirates. Today's pirates are too small to capture this externality. However, a big pirate that published thousands of titles could capture the spillover. This would make copying even more 307. For convenience, we assume that the pirated copy is priced at cost. If the pirated copy is marked up, the digital bookstore's revenue would be correspondingly higher.
308. U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, at 64, 66 (documenting industry trend toward concentrating more and more resources on fewer titles). One explanation for the effect is that the public sees advertising budgets as a quality signal. This creates an arm's race in which each publisher tries to buy more ads than his competitors. Like real arms races, the competition erodes profit while yielding very little social return.
312. See supra Part VILA.
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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66: 495 profitable, increase the number of pirated titles, and further reduce the digital bookstore's markup. 313 Second, self-help methods could also be undermined by improved search engines. Today's search engines force consumers to click through multiple "hits" before finding a pirated edition. But in the future, a single mouse click could suffice. This could be done by centralizing piracy in a single large pirate, launching a pirate bookstore that specialized in selling illicit editions, or investing in better search engines. The silver lining is that all of these piracy strategies introduce new scale economies and new chokepoints for regulation. This suggests that copyright's eclipse is only temporary.
Finally, pirates could find safe havens beyond the reach of American copyright law. So far, the Western world has limited overseas piracy through a combination of diplomatic leverage and holding host countries' appetite for Western brands and capital markets hostage? 14 These levers are certain to erode as the West's share of world output shrinks? 15 This may not matter if non-Western intellectual property industries grow to the point where host countries have a bigger stake in enforcement. 316 Failing that, the West's only recourse will be to build firewalls between rich nation consumers and foreign pirates. 317 This is uncomfortably close to what countries like China and Iran already do for I . . I 318 po Itica reasons.
C. The Radical Solution: Replacing Editors
So far this Article has assumed that effective search requires human judgment by experts. However, audience surveys and search engine methods could conceivably improve to the point where human editors become superfluous. This would probably require audience members to become much 2014] FROM BARDS TO SEARCH ENGINES 537 more involved than they are today. This section discusses how for-profit and open source institutions could persuade them to do this.
The 300,000 new titles published in English each year almost certainly include undiscovered gems. However, individual readers have a hard time finding them because uncoordinated search forces readers to plow through the same bad books over and over again. A commercial "Book Discovery Club" could overcome the problem by suggesting new books while screening out titles readers have repeatedly rejected in the past. Readers who allow themselves be managed in this way would almost certainly find better books than they could on their own. The Club could then gauge readers' reactions through some combination of explicit surveys and monitoring how quickly books were consumed.
In principle, readers should be willing to join a Book Discovery Club even if they have to buy books at retail. In practice, publishers would almost certainly subsidize promising titles as a form of marketing. These discounts would further bolster members' appetite for search.
Cash discounts and the inherent pleasure of reading are not the only way to motivate volunteers. Experience with open source software suggests that people also supply labor for "soft" reasons like inherent enjoyment, altruism, and a desire to impress others?I 9 Current initiatives that ask volunteers to remove errors from scanned e-books 320 or create audio books from public domain texts 32 I show that similar incentives can be mobilized for book production. There is also evidence that readers can be persuaded to donate editing judgment, most notably by identifying particularly attractive images 322 and reviewing longforgotten books. 323 While the per-person effort is usually small, 324 this may not matter if enough people participate. The alternative is to encourage members who create resources for their own use to take the small additional step of [VOL. 66:495 sharing it. 325 Initiatives in which enthusiasts find and publish old-time radio recordings fit into this category. 326 Therefore, it is hard to know which method would generate the most effort.
An open source initiative to find and rank order titles would be more challenging than any of these examples. In particular, leaders would have to show that they could screen out poor quality volunteers and direct manpower toward whichever books most needed review. For now, these seem like reasonable goals.
Finally, one can imagine business models that mix commercial incentives with voluntarism. In the software world, for-profit firms often interact with, and even subsidize, open source collaborations. 32 At least one similarly cooperative model has already emerged in publishing. 328 This suggests that publishers will eventually find it in their interest to support initiatives that discover and rank order book titles.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars often assume that commercial publishing is synonymous with copyright. In fact, Roman and early modem societies constructed vigorous publishing industries with no formal protection at all. 329 The real policy failing was that self-help evaporated after the first edition. This led to a disastrous conservatism that entrenched "classics" for hundreds of years. The situation at the start of the twenty-first century is disturbin~ly similar. , 2002) ). Students trying to learn a skill or attract the potential employers further augment this labor. Here, the existence of high wage jobs acts as a prize to elicit effort. 328. Companies that print on-demand books already pay fifteen percent of their profits back to the Gutenberg collaboration's open source book-scanning program. This directly benefits them by increasing the number of titles that consumers can order. Tredition Classics, "Literature Projects," available at http://www.tredition.com/projects (Tredition uses Gutenberg texts for 15,000 of its I 00,000 titles and returns fifteen percent of its profits to the project). 
2014]
FROM BARDS TO SEARCH ENGINES 539 There are only three ways forward. First, publishers can try to shore up existing commercial models. This is unlikely to work for e-books, although it might suffice for movies and music. Second, commercial models can migrate to new institutions. This will almost certainly mean leveraging economies of scale in search. Finally, society can revert to the original Homeric model by collecting editing judgments directly from audiences. This will mean finding institutions that persuade consumers to transform themselves from essentially passive surveillance targets to active collaborators in search.
